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FREE SPEECH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
Thomas Kleven t
Everyone has a point of view,
And everyone is entitled to.
Ah, how much simpler life would be
If everyone agreed with me.'
This Article argues that the regulation of free speech, in
addition to being a matter of principle, is an aspect of a power
struggle among social forces with differing views as to the direction
in which society should go. The primary focus will be the regulation
of racist and sexist speech. Part I discusses the issue in general. Part
II illustrates the general discussion through an analysis of three
recent cases, two decided by the Supreme Court last term and one
before the Court this term. The cases are Rust v. Sullivan,2 in which
the Court upheld the Department of Health and Human Service's
gag rule barring abortion counseling in federally funded family
planning projects; Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,' in which the Court
upheld Indiana's public indecency statute as applied to nude
t Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern

University.
'Thomas Kleven, Unpublished Poem (1991).
2 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
3 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
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dancing; and In the Matter of the Welfare of R.A.V., 4 in which the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a St. Paul hate speech ordinance
as applied to the burning of a cross in the yard of an
African-American family's home.
I. DECONSTRUCTING FREE SPEECH

Free speech is central to many highly-charged contemporary
issues: political correctness, racial defamation, pornography, abortion
counseling, and others. The issues are highly charged because they
involve monumental power struggles over society's direction and
people's places in the social order. To express my bias, I would put
the question thus: Is this to remain a predominantly Eurocentric,
white male dominated, highly stratified society, or is it to become
more inclusive, less oppressive, and more egalitarian?
That many would challenge my portrayal of this society
illustrates why free speech is central. Unchallenged, my perspective
may win the day. Unexpressed, it may never take root if we who
share this view are unable to communicate with each other, to
develop the solidarity necessary for collective action, and to convince
others to join us. Thus, as reflected in all the issues mentioned
above, all sides have the incentive both to have their views widely
aired and to suppress the other sides' views - either by law, as per
civil or criminal sanctions against racist or sexist speech or
prohibitions against advising women about abortion, or through
social disapproval, as certain racist and sexist terms have now
become largely (if perhaps diminishingly) unacceptable.
Thus free speech is not just a matter of abstract principle,
although free speech issues are often so debated, but is also an aspect
of a power struggle between contending forces with divergent axes
to grind. Indeed, whether one addresses free speech issues in the
abstract or in context is itself an aspect of the underlying power
struggle. Those who think an abstract focus will help them win will
likely attempt to so channel the debate, and vice versa for those who
think a contextual focus will help. Even the principled advocate of
unrestrained free speech is engaged in a power struggle, if not for
material advantage then perhaps to create a social order premised on
dispassionate discourse.
In this Article I hope to illuminate the relationship between
464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
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free speech as abstract principle and as power struggle. A basic
question is whether free speech is or should be a preeminent or
preferred value in social life. Should free speech always override
other concerns, or may other concerns trump free speech, and if so,
when? My thesis is that the attempt to answer these questions
implicates other basic questions concerning society's power
arrangements.
Whose interests are served in upholding or
restraining free speech? Does free speech benefit everyone equally?
Does it promote, or stand in the way of, a more just or less
oppressive social order? To illustrate the discussion, I shall focus on
free speech in general and on racist and sexist speech specifically.
One answer to the question of the value bf free speech is that
it is a preeminent or preferred value in this society because the
Constitution makes it so.' That answer is inadequate for several
reasons. For one, it begs the question of why free speech should be
a constitutionally protected value. For another, while the right of
free speech is enshrined in the Constitution, it has never been
interpreted as absolute.6 Some speech, such as obscenity or libel, is
unprotected.7 Other speech, while usually protected, can be
overridden by a compelling governmental interest; for example,
speech may be restricted when it poses a clear and present danger
of causing some harmful action such as a riot.8 Speech may also be
limited by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, as long as
s The First Amendment to the Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). "Allowing the
broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under
all circumstances." Id. at 571 (footnote omitted).
7 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
283 (1964) (false statements made with actual malice are not protected by the

Constitution). See infra note 78 for the standards governing the regulation of
obscenity. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text for the standards
governing the regulation of libel.
' See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (words which tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace are not protected by the Constitution). See infra notes 83-110
and accompanying text for the standards governing the regulation of inciteful
expression.
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other avenues of expression are left open.9 Restrictively applied, as
they have been at times, these standards do elevate free speech to a
high priority value."0 But the same standards also can be, have
been, and are now being applied more loosely by the Supreme Court
in order to defer more to legislation that restrains free speech in
favor of other social values." Whether speech is obscene or
libelous, whether the government has a compelling interest, or

whether a time/place/manner restriction is reasonable are all highly
Despite the
flexible and highly manipulable determinations.
constitutional proscription against abridging free speech, therefore,
underlying every free speech issue lurks a value judgment as to how

important free speech is in general and in the particular case.
How important, then, is free speech? As abstract principle,
free speech is important because of its relationship both to individual
personhood and to collective discourse.12 As to personhood, the
opportunity to express oneself as one sees fit is part of what it means
to be an individual, to feel fulfilled, and to realize creative potential,
irrespective of whether others agree or disagree or are even aware of
one's expressions." Some are creative for self enjoyment only, and
have no desire to share with others. Usually, though, people
communicate with others, whether positively or negatively, as a way
of establishing or concluding relationships with them. Either way,
9See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1983)
(prohibition of camping in public park as applied to overnight tent-city
demonstration concerning homeless plight); Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (prohibition of sale or distribution of
literature at state fair except from booth rented from state); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (regulation of the location of adult theaters).
10See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 909 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("The preservation of the right to free and robust speech is accorded
high priority in our society and under the Constitution.").
"See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (upholding ban on
soliciting contributions on postal premises); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding ban on "independent expenditures" from
corporate general treasury in state elections); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (upholding ban on broadcasting of indecent though not obscene language);
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding ban on demonstrations on military
bases); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (First Amendment inapplicable to
public areas of privately owned shopping center).
12 See Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justification,89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130-45
(1989) [hereinafter Greeanwalt, Free Speech]; Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 591-92 (1982).
13 Redish, supra note 12, at 596-605.
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free speech is integral to individual self-determination, and to the
pursuit of one's chosen identity and destiny.'4
But if the opportunity to express oneself is integral to
personhood, then so is freedom from those things which deny one's
personhood. Slavery, for example, denies personhood because liberty
is essential to self-determination. Indeed, oppression and domination
in any form similarly deny personhood in that they deprive people
of the opportunity to fulfill themselves and realize their potential.
To the extent, therefore, that racist speech contributes to racial
oppression or sexist speech to male domination, then such speech
denies personhood. There can be little doubt that racist and sexist
speech do so contribute. Racist and sexist practices have always
been accompanied by supportive ideologies justifying these practices
and helping to create an atmosphere in which they can flourish."
Moreover, racist and sexist speech directly deny personhood by
denying the worth of the other as a human being. There is ample
evidence of the pervasive psychological damage which this racist and
sexist culture has caused to women and ethnic minorities. 16 Even
those strong enough to withstand the verbal slight are affected by
having to. conduct their lives, in order to overcome it, other than they
might otherwise choose to.
Thus racist and sexist. speech undercuts individual
self-determination every bit as much as does the denial of the
opportunity to speak. Having to endure such speech is every bit a
denial of one's personhood as is not being allowed to speak at all.
Note that this is not yet an argument for or against sanctioning racist
and sexist speech. Rather, the argument is that in the abstract the
personhood rationale for free speech cuts equally against it in the
context of racism and sexism. If speech is denied, that undercuts the
14For an explanation of the personhood rationale for free speech, see C. Edwin

Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 9901029 (1978); Redish, supra note 12, at 593-94; David Richards, Free Speech and
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45,
59-70 (1974); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
204 (1972).
's See infra notes 16 and 26.
1' See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYcHOANALYTIc THEORY (1989);
JULIET MITCHELL, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM (1974); Richard Delgado, Words
That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Namecalling, 17 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 133, 135-49 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320,232641 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Public Response].
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personhood of the speaker; whereas if speech is allowed, that
undercuts the personhood of the other. What we have, in short, is
a power struggle which the personhood rationale cannot resolve
without further examination of why speech should be a preferred
value.
As to the relationship between free speech as abstract
principle and collective discourse, the opportunity to express oneself17
is integral to the search for truth (if one believes in that concept),
or (if not) to democracy defined as the pursuit of collective identity,
preferences and mores."8 From the former vantage point, the
discovery of truth is a social good to which the suppression of
speech is inimical because the truthfulness of an idea can be
appraised only when extant.' 9 Moreover, since the discovery of
truth is usually, if not always, the result of the cumulative efforts of
many people over time, the opportunity for people to communicate
with each other must not be restrained. Once, however, one becomes
convinced of having discovered truth, and believes as well that truth
will not necessarily win out and that the purveyors of untruth have
frequently been able to dupe people into believing untruth, then the
principled commitment to free speech wanes. Modesty, as well as
intellectual honesty, may compel one genuinely desiring truth to be
cautious about dogmatism, but once one is truly convinced of truth,
absolute and unchanging truth, then speech is no longer needed as
an instrument for discovering truth but only for its perpetuation.20
If, however, in this post-modem era, one comes to doubt the
existence of truth, believing instead that social life is or should be
about the pursuit of collective identity, free speech remains of
ongoing importance as a means of debating and deciding upon
'7

Greenawalt, Free Speech, supra note 12, at 130; see also JOHN STUART

LIBERTY 15-20 (A. Castell ed., 1947) (1859).
18 Greenawalt, Free Speech, supra note 12, at

MILL, ON

130-33 (discussing John Stuart Mill's
defense of freedom of speech).
" For truth seeking theories of free speech, see id. at 130-41; MILL, supra note
17, at 15-54.
' "Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with
all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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society's ever changing preferences and mores.21 Still, there are
arguments for controlling free speech. One might think the pursuit
of collective identity justifiable only in an egalitarian setting, so that
a supposed collective decision does not mask the reality of
domination.' From that perspective, unequal access to the means
of communication is problematic, since those in a better position to
express their views will have an unfair advantage. Their more
prominent voices may enable them to mold public opinion and to
make it seem as if their views are more widely held or strongly felt
than they really are.'
Domination of debate contributes to
domination overall.
Consequently, one might think it desirable to equalize access
to the means of communication, either by enhancing the access of
those with less power or limiting that of those with more.24 While
21For collective self-determination

theories of free speech, see THOMAS

EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 43-53 (1970) [hereinafter
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM]; ALEXANDER MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND Is RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1948); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521; Alexander Meikeljohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
' Therefore, Jurgen Habermas, in Theory and Practice, speaks of an "ideal
situation of discourse" as integral to his consensus theory of truth. JURGEN
HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-40 (1973). And John Rawls and Bruce
Ackerman, in A Theory of Justice, and Social Justice in the Liberal State, respectively,
both create egalitarian discursive contexts in which their hypothetical discoursers
impartially determine liberal principles ofjustice. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE
IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)
' See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, WVhy the State? 100 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1987); Judith
Lichtenberg, Foundationsand Limits of Freedom of the Press,16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 329
(1987); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics:Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982); Stephen L. Carter,
Technology, Democracy,and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581 (1984) (book
review).
24 The FCC's fairness doctrine (now repealed), requiring broadcasters to present
full and fair coverage of all sides of public issues and to afford attacked parties and
opponents of endorsed candidates a reasonable opportunity to reply, is an example
of access enhancement. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(upholding the fairness doctrine against a First Amendment challenge). Limitations
on campaign and political contributions and expenditures are examples of access
limitation. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(upholding state statute prohibiting corporate contributions and independent
expenditures regarding state candidate elections except from segregated funds);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (overthrowing state statute
prohibiting corporate expenditures and contributions to influence issues submitted
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the former might be thought preferable in that it increases speech,
enhancing access may not always be feasible or desirable. At some
point too much speech might become overwhelming, or it might
seem too costly in light of other social priorities to enhance
everyone's access to the highest level. Thus the egalitarian pursuit
of collective identity might require some curtailment of the speech of
those with disproportionate access to the means of communication.
Here the power struggle is between those who view truth as
an open question and those who do not, between those with greater
access to the means of communication and those with less. And
again the struggle over racism and sexism is illustrative. Suppose,
as one might characterize the United States, a society with a history
of racism and sexism, that some progress has been made in
combatting these evils, but that they are now resurgent and are being
promoted by the racist and sexist sloganeering of those intent on
turning back the clock. Suppose, further, that while whites and men
still predominate politically, minorities and women (and their allies)
have attained enough power to bring about some restraint on racist
and sexist speech. Why, then, not allow governmental regulation as
part of an effort to curtail the resurgence before it is too late?
Again, there are unresolvable competing arguments, reflective
of the underlying power struggle. On the one hand, one might
argue that the nation has become so committed, morally and
constitutionally if not as yet fully in practice, to a
non-racist/non-sexist social order that a contrary point of view is not
acceptable, and that even though free speech is itself an important
value, it must sometimes give way to compelling considerations of
equal stature. 25 In rebuttal one might argue that no point of view
is so privileged as to be beyond debate in this discursive democracy.
The argument is that however committed the nation may now be to
a non-racist/non-sexist social order it is entitled to change its stance,
and that even the most reprehensible point of view is entitled to a
to voters); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (overthrowing as violative of the First
Amendment various campaign contribution and expenditure limits, except for
limits on individual contributions to specific candidates).
s See, e.g., Thomas David Jones, Article 4 of the InternationalConvention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminationand the FirstAmendment, 23 How. L.J.
429 (1980); David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445,
447 (1987); Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 16, at 234148.
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At this point one might advance a slippery slope argument
in favor of free speech and against restraints on speech. While the
speech in question may be of negligible merit, or like racist or sexist
speech may even entail some immediate public harm, in the long run
free speech is arguably so crucial to individual self-determination
and to the preservation of a democratic order that the temptation to
restrict undesirable speech should be resisted, lest a precedent be set
which makes it easier to justify clamping down on meritorious
speech later on. Note, however, that a similar argument could be
advanced against government regulation of all types. If the freedom
to speak is crucial to individual self-determination and to a viable
democracy, then so, arguably, is the freedom to act, and so should
the temptation to restrict activities now deemed undesirable be
resisted lest society move down the slippery slope to totalitarianism.
Why, then, should speech receive more protection against
government regulation than action? Not, it seems, on the ground
that action is necessarily more harmful to others or society at large
than is speech. Speech can definitely be harmful. It can cause
emotional pain, ruin one's reputation, or contribute to oppression.
Attempts to regulate speech only occur because people feel harmed
by it in one way or another. Nor is harmful action necessarily more
immediate and irreversible than harmful speech. While some acts
cause immediate and irreversible harm, so does some speech.
Moreover, acts are frequently regulated not because they are
immediately harmful, but due to their potential future harm if left
unregulated. Why should speech not be similarly regulable?
A possible answer, acknowledging the difficulty of
distinguishing speech and action in terms of their harmfulness, might
21 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS,

THE SKOKIE CASE AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech,

Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991). These
writers all argue for unrestricted free speech and the toleration of extremist speech
especially in the domain of public discourse. While they favor protecting extremist
speech in the belief that tolerating it will actually help promote a tolerant social
order, and that uninhibited debate is a better protection against extremism than
suppression of extremist expression, implicit in unrestricted speech and uninhibited

debate is the possibility that extremist views may prevail.
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be that speech is necessary in order to be able to effect change.27
Something previously deemed harmful can always be deregulated
when views change, but deregulation is unlikely if it is forbidden to
advocate for it. While this argument may make sense in the abstract,
it is important to look at the matter in context. Does free speech in
fact facilitate change? Does it benefit the disadvantaged and
disempowered by enabling them to organize and advocate reform?
Or is free speech largely an illusion which helps perpetuate hierarchy
by giving the disenchanted an outlet to release steam and by
channelling their disenchantment into relatively polite debate rather
than into more intensive and disruptive efforts at fundamental
systemic change?' And are the powers-that-be, because they are
more powerful, inevitably able to dominate the discourse by
promoting ways of thinking which give more credence to elite
propaganda and articulation and which enable them to justify the
repression of speech which overly threatens their dominant position?2
27 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 92-122 (1989);
THOMAS ERWIN EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
11-15 (1966).
28 See EMERSON, THE SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 7:
[T]he process of open discussion promotes greater cohesion in
society because people are more ready to accept decisions that
go against them if they have a part in the decision-making
process. Freedom of expression thus provides a framework in
which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take
place without destroying the society.
It is an essential
mechanism for maintaining the balance between stability and

change.
For example, I do not think one can explain the journey from Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919),
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919), all of which upheld convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917, to
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which overthrew a conviction under
Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Anderson
1987), as simply reflecting the development of a more enlightened or permissive
view of free speech. Historical context is equally or more important. Abrams, Debs,
Frohwerk and Schenck, as well as Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), and
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), which upheld convictions of socialists
under state criminal anarchy/syndicalism statutes, all revolved around opposition
to United States involvement in the First World War or the Red Scare following the
Russian Revolution -- a period of intense anti-radicalism in which the fate of the
country and the dominance of the power elite were seen as on the line. See
Christopher Hitchens, A Socialist'sStruggleAgainst Injustice, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30,1991,
at 50. It seems no coincidence that the overturning of later convictions of
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Speech has certainly contributed to reform movements
in the
United States. The opportunity to advocate for change has
contributed, for example, to the women's and civil rights movements.
Yet male domination and racism are still prevalent, if in altered form.
Indeed, despite all the seeming advances, it is arguable that overall
women and ethnic minorities are not significantly better off as a
result of many of the reforms which have been won. Women and
African-Americans now have the right to vote, but years after those
victories relatively few hold political office and white males still
dominate the political process as a whole. Women and ethnic
minorities are present in greater numbers in fields of endeavor once
foreclosed, but are also disproportionately and increasingly subjected
to poverty and violence. And contributing to the continuing racism
and male domination is the greater access of those in power to the
means of communication, in the form, for example, of pervasive
racist and sexist imagery in the mass media and barely veiled racist
and sexist politicking from the highest levels of government on
down.'
communists for similar offenses in Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) and
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), came not too long before the United States'
alliance with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany during the Second World
War. Then following that war and with the onset of the Cold War came Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which upheld the conviction of a communist
under the Smith Act (also known as the Espionage Act), Espionage Act of 1917, ch.
30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1918) (repealed 1948). After a series of cases going both
ways in the ensuing years, see, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)
(affirming conviction under the Smith Act) and Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363
(1958) (reversing conviction under the Smith Act), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969), held that mere advocacy of unlawful action is not enough but must be
accompanied by a threat of imminent lawless action. Id. at 447. Again, although
Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan leader, it seems no coincidence that
communism was then coming to be seen as less of a threat and that the Cold War
was beginning to thaw. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Cold War's Sudden Thaw Skews U.S.
PoliticalCompass for 1992; In Foreign Policy Arena, Some CampaignRivals Sound Oddly
Alike, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1991, at A17. But let a new era arise in which the
people in power perceive their interests in jeopardy, and we will likely again see
successful attempts to clamp down on system-challenging speech.
" For example, George Bush's "kick ass" statement regarding his vicepresidential debate with Geraldine Ferraro during the 1984 presidential campaign,
the Willie Horton ads in Bush's 1988 campaign against Michael Dukakis, the antiaffirmative action ads in Jesse Helms' campaign for the Senate against Harvey
Gantt, and David Duke's campaign for governor of Louisiana, are a few more
notable recent incidents. See Thomas B. Edsall, Recent Election Results Affirm Past
Bush Tactics; Racial, Social Themes Worked to Advantage, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1991,
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This is still not an argument for or against free speech in the
abstract, but for recognizing the power-struggle implications of free
speech and for responding accordingly. In the abstract one who
believes, as do I, in the ideal of an egalitarian discursive democracy
must support free speech. Racist and sexist speech would not likely
be an issue in such a society because it would be nonexistent or de
minimis. An egalitarian discursive democracy could not function as
such unless it had a non-racist/non-sexist culture in which most
people respected each other and did not even think, much less speak,
in racist or sexist terms. It is only because this is still a racist and
sexist society that the issue even arises.
So from a practical perspective the question must be whether
regulating racist and sexist speech will help create a social order in
which such controls are no longer necessary. Or is success in
combatting racism and sexism more likely when the issues are in the
open and confronted directly? A related question is the ability to
secure controls against racist and sexist speech. Ironically, it is likely
to be easier to enact controls when they are least needed, that is,
when society is already well along the path to a non-racist/non-sexist
culture, and more difficult when they are most needed, that is, when
the forces of racism and sexism abound.
The situation in the United States today seems somewhere in
the middle.
We are certainly nowhere close to a
non-racist/non-sexist utopia and in fact are facing something of a
racist and sexist backlash. Yet the anti-racist/anti-sexist movement
is strong enough to have some political impact. So some controls
seem feasible, such as in the educational setting or in more
progressive locales. 1 Such controls will likely be minimal,
however, and will leave open many avenues for racist and sexist
speech. In most contexts, as when the President plays up to racism
at A12; Ken Fineman & Patricia O'Brien, Ferraro, Bush Smug Over Results of their
Debate, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 31, 1984, at 12A; David Rosenbaum, Bush Talks Tough
on Crime, Criticizing Prisoner Furlough Program, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1988, at B7;
Roberto Suro, Ex-Klan Chief Has Even Odds in Governor's Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1991, at 1.

3'On the debate over the extent to which controls on extremist speech on
campus are justifiable see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1990); Charles R. Lawrence, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431; Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus:A Modest Proposal,1990 DuKE L. J.484.
Such controls have not fared well in the courts, see, e.g., John Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Mich. 1989), discussed infra note 110.
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for political advantage, there will be little choice but head-on
confrontation.
The arguable merit of direct confrontation is the opportunity
it presents to impact the other person's thinking, whereas
suppressing the issue may simply, postpone the inevitable
confrontation. The burgeoning ethnic tensions in Eastern Europe,
following an era of suppression under authoritarian rule, are an
example. Perhaps confrontation, although it may well extend beyond
a mere war of words, is a necessary step in the development of
mutual respect and sensitivity. Perhaps progress is impossible
without struggle. At the same time, limited restrictions against racist
and sexist speech, in a society where racism and sexism must in
general be confronted directly, may signal society's evolving morality
and thereby help moderate the debate and prevent it from exploding
into more violent struggle. Allowing racist speech as evidence of
discriminatory purpose in race discrimination cases,32 for instance,
seems to have had some positive influence on people's thinking and
some moderating impact on the civil rights debate - temporarily so,
at least, given the recent resurgence of racism. Implicated, therefore,
in the free speech issue is the question of whether an imperfectly
democratic society such as the United States can evolve in a less
oppressive direction through dialogue, perhaps controlled somewhat
so as to keep the dialogue going and to prevent it from becoming
overly confrontational, or whether more intensive struggle is
necessary and inevitable.
This raises the question of why racism and sexism occur. Are
they genetically ingrained or primordial ways of thinking and acting
which will always be with us?' Or are they primarily outgrowths
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (statements of members of legislative body are relevant proof of
purposeful discrimination regarding exclusionary zoning); White v. Register, 412
U.S. 755 (1973) (racist campaign tactics contribute to proof of improper dilution of
minority voting strength regarding multimember districts).
' For views that the social differences between men and women derive in large
part from biological and genetic factors, see, e.g., JUDITH M. BARDWICK,
32

PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1971); STEPHANIE B. GOLDBERG, THE INEVITABILITY OF
PATRIARCHY (1973); EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 125-54 (1978). For

views that racism and ethnocentrism are biologically or primordially based, see,
e.g., MILTON M. GORDON, HUMAN NATURE, CLASS AND ETHNIcITY (1978); PIERRE L.
VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM (1981); Clifford Geertz, The Integrative
Revolution: PrimordialSentiments and Civil Politics in the New States, in OLD SOCIETIES
AND NEW STATES 105-57 (Clifford Geertz ed. 1963). None of these thinkers denies
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of and interrelated with the material/cultural conditions of social
life?' If so, neither dialogue nor regulation of racist and sexist
speech will suffice to eliminate racism and sexism without changes
in the underlying social conditions. Both racism and sexism, for
example, may arise in inegalitarian cultures as a means of justifying
inequality, of protecting the status of the privileged by creating
underprivileged classes to bear the brunt of the society's hardships,
and of forestalling movement for change by pitting potential allies
among the oppressed against each other. If so, then racism and
sexism will likely remain as long as inequality persists, or to the
extent that they diminish will likely be replaced by some other form
of oppression.
The opportunity to dialogue is obviously crucial to, and the
regulation of racist and sexist speech may well help advance,
egalitarian movements. My point here, though, is that some
mammoth societal dialogue which wins over people's hearts and
minds will not in itself eliminate racism and sexism in the United
States or any other oppressive society, and that dialogue must be
accompanied by the alteration of the social conditions which impel
or contribute to racist and sexist thinking and practice.
Unfortunately, in my view, since racism and sexism are not just
the influence of contingent historical factors on gender and racial differences and
conflicts, nor contends that these differences and conflicts are immutable, although
the implication is that because of their biological and primordial origins they are
such deep-seated phenomena that overcoming them all will be most difficult.
' Those who hold this view or some variation of it span a wide range of
thinkers: from mainstream liberals who see sexism and racism as an autonomous
or relatively autonomous social/cultural phenomena, to orthodox marxists who see
them as economically determined or class struggle related phenomena, to postmodernists/post-structuralists who see class, race, and sex as overdetermined
phenomena which are causally and explanatorily interrelated with each other and
with all aspects of social life. For a sampling of the literature, see ROBERT BLAUNER,
RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA (1972); O.C. COX, CASTE, CLASS AND RACE (1970);
DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1976); ANDREA JAGGAR,
FEMINIST POLmCS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); LEO KUPER, RACE, CLASS AND
POWER (1974); MANNING MARABLE, How CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK
AMERICA (1983); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE

UNITED STATES (1986); Harriet Fraad, Stephen Resnick & Richard Wolff, For Every
Knight in Shining Armor, There's a Castle Waiting to be Cleaned: A Marxist - Feminist
Analysis of the Household, RETHINKING MARXISM 9-65 (Winter 1989); Ann Ferguson,

The Intersection of Race, Gender and Class in the United States Today, RETHINKING
MARXISM 45-64 (Fall-Winter 1990); Nancy Holmstrom, A Marxist Theory of Women's
Nature, in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 69-86 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990).
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misguided ways of thinking, but are related to the material and
psychic advantages of the more powerful who will undoubtedly
resist change so as to preserve their privileged position, dialogue
alone will probably not be enough to overcome the resistance and
bring about the necessary social change - although this in itself is an
open question which will only be answered as history unfolds.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES

So far in my effort to deconstruct free speech, to weaken the
arguments for free speech as a preeminent value while still
acknowledging its importance, I have been noncommittal about
particular proposals to regulate speech. There is some uncertainty
as to the impact of such regulation. A seemingly good regulation,
whether of speech or action, can have unintended consequences
which actually worsen the situation.' Nevertheless, if we want to
influence history we cannot just sit on the sideline as it unfolds, but
must take a stand. So, despite lingering doubts about its efficacy, I
am persuaded that some regulation of racist and sexist speech is
called for - just as, by way of analogy, despite my belief in the ideal
of a color-blind and gender-blind society and despite the risk of
backlash, I believe in the necessity for race and gender-based
affirmative action as a means of counteracting racist and sexist
decision-making in this less than ideal world. In part this
willingness reflects a hope that regulation will help promote a
non-racist/non-sexist society. More importantly, though, there seems
to be a developing pro-regulation consensus among those seeking to
move this society in that direction, and especially among those
against whom racist and sexist speech has been directed. The voices
of the oppressed must be listened to and heeded.3 Solidarity is
absolutely essential to any movement for social change.
Given the importance of free speech and the variety of
situations in which speech might conflict with other values, the
decision as to the appropriateness of regulation must be highly
context specific and must carefully weigh the competing interests at
s See Kretzmer, supra note 25, at 509-13; Strossen, supra note 31, at 554-61.
3 See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987) ("[Those who have
experienced discrimination speak with a special voice to which we should listen.")
[hereinafter Matsuda, Looking]; Martha Minow, Forward: Justice Endangered, 101
HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987).
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stake. 7 In general, regulation is most justifiable when designed to
promote a more egalitarian and less oppressive society, and should
be vigorously opposed when it preserves hierarchy and domination
- although as a good deconstructionist I must acknowledge that
there will always be competing arguments as to which is the case.
A. Rust v. Sullivan
For example, proponents of the gag rule against abortion
counseling in federally funded family planning projects, recently
upheld by the Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan,' might argue that
the rule helps deter what they claim to be the oppressive act of
abortion. This argument, as well as the Supreme Court's rationale in
upholding the rule, is insufficiently sensitive to context. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's rhetorical tack in the majority opinion is first to
repeatedly 39'characterize the gag rule as prohibiting abortion-related
"activities," thus manipulating the speech-action distinction so as
to deemphasize the impact on free expression. The opinion then
argues that the government is entitled to select among those activities
it chooses to fund in the public interest, that declining to finance a
constitutionally protected right is different from prohibiting it
because the right can still be exercised, that the impact on
doctor-patient communications is minimal because other avenues to
obtain information about abortion remain open, and that a patient in
a federally funded family planning program does not have a
legitimate expectation of comprehensive medical advice regarding
pregnancy since the program does not provide comprehensive
7See Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist
and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171 (1990) (advocating that controls on
extremist speech be evaluated per such factors as the relationship to violence, the
stigmatizing impact, the forum where expression occurs, and whether the speech
is generalized or directed at particular individuals).
3'

111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). On March 21, 1992, the Department of Health and

Human Services issued new guidelines softening its stand on abortion counseling
at Title X clinics. Despite the ruling of the Court in Rust, the guidelines made it
possible for a doctor to give a patient full medical treatment, even if this ultimately
ends in an abortion. The gag rule upheld by the Supreme Court in Rust, however,
was not altered with regard to nurses or other health care professionals. David G.
Savage, U.S. Modifies Abortion-Advice rulesfor Clinics, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992, at

1.
3 Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764, 1772, 1773, 1775.
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pregnancy-related care.'
That the government may select among the activities it
chooses to fund is unexceptional as a general proposition. There are
not enough funds for everything, and the government need not
subsidize what are deemed public harms. Nor must the government
be neutral as to its own or as between contending points of view. In
selecting among alternatives the government necessarily takes a
position, at least implicitly, in favor of the activities it chooses to
fund. Even a governmental position adverse to a constitutional right
may at times be justifiable. While in the free exercise of their religion
people may have the right to exclude others based on race and to
preach their racial superiority in the eyes of God, the government
should remain free to foster integration and racial tolerance, even to
the point of requiring religious schools to expose their students to
those values.4 ' A commitment to democratic pluralism demands
both the promotion of tolerance and the toleration of intolerance in
certain spheres of social life.
What is troublesome about the gag rule, therefore, is not that
,the government is taking a position, but that in taking a position
against abortion the government is promoting male domination of
women. One cannot fully understand the abortion issue divorced
from context, from the historical subordination of women in this
society both through law and social practice, from the fact that the
overwhelming majority of legislators and judges are men.
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion is far more sensitive to
the realities of the situation: to the fact that the practical impact of
the gag rule will be to deny to many pregnant women, and
particularly to poor women and teenagers who have little choice but
to rely on federally funded family planning programs for advice,
needed information about their pregnancy-related options.' A rule
which requires doctors to fully inform women about all their options
40

Id. at 1772-76.

4, See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
private schools from practicing racially discriminatory admissions, although such
schools may have a First Amendment right to "promote the belief that racial
segregation is desirable," id. at 160); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(affirming constitutional right of parents to place compulsory school age children
in private school, but recognizing state's right to reasonably regulate private schools
including requiring "that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must

be taught," id. at 533.).
' Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1785-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and forbids doctors from inducing women to pursue the doctor's
preference would be sensitive to women's needs. The gag rule tries
to keep women ignorant about abortion options, and ignorance is
subordination.
B. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
On the other hand, the Indiana "public indecency" law
prohibiting nudity in public, upheld by the Supreme Court in Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc.' as consistent with the First Amendment as
applied to nude dancing in a private club, arguably promotes
women's equality. The display of women's bodies for purposes of
titillation is widely and increasingly viewed in the feminist
movement as an objectification of women which furthers male
domination by fostering sexist thinking among both men and women
and which directly exploits the women involved even though they
may not be aware of it." Nevertheless, before approving of the
result in Barnes, it is important to examine the decision's disquieting
aspects as regards the value of free expression.
For one, the five members of the Court who voted to uphold
the law seem prepared to take an increasingly deferential approach
to the regulation of expression, or at least of non-speech conduct
with expressive overtones. Under prevailing doctrine, otherwise
protected expression is regulable only when the government has a
compelling justificatory interest or there is a clear and present danger
of some harm the government may legitimately prevent.' In United
States v. O'Brien,' however, the Court relaxed this standard in the
case of non-speech conduct with expressive overtones, holding that
such conduct may be regulated, despite "incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms,"47 when the regulation furthers "an
important or substantial governmental interest... unrelated to the
suppression of free expression ....
"" In applying this distinction
111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981);
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 127-213 (1987); MARIANA
VALVERDE, SEX, POWER AND PLEASURE (1985); Laurie Shrage, Should Feminists Oppose
Prostitution?,in CHODOROW, supra note 16, at 185-99.
45 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 832-56 (2d ed. 1988).
-391 U.S. 367 (1968).
4'id. at 376.
8Id. at 377.
43

"See, e.g., ANDREA
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between the direct regulation of expressive conduct for suppressive
purposes and the incidental regulation of expressive conduct for
non-suppressive purposes, the plurality opinion in Barnes reasoned
that the Indiana public indecency law was an example of the latter
in that its purpose was not to regulate nude dancing per se due to
objections to its concededly expressive purpose of conveying an
erotic message, but was to regulate public nudity "whether or not it
is combined with expressive activity"49 and for the "substantial
government interest in protecting order and morality"' - which
interest the Court characterized as "unrelated to the suppression of
free expression."51 "Public nudity is the evil the state seeks to
prevent, whether or not it is combined with expressive activity." 2
Justice Scalia went one step further in his concurring opinion.5
Adopting the plurality's characterization of nudity per se as
non-expressive conduct and of the impact on nude dancing as an
incidental impact on expressive activity of forbidding conduct for
non-suppressive reasons, Justice Scalia would hold the First
Amendment inapplicable at all and subject the regulation to the
rational basis test which is easily satisfied by the state's moral
objection to nudity.'
But what is it about nudity per se that is morally
objectionable if not an objection to the ideas which are implicitly
expressed when someone is nude or which are conjured up in the
mind of the beholder upon seeing or knowing about nudity? People
dress or undress for various reasons. They may choose to clothe
themselves as protection against natural elements or to shed their
clothing because they find it physically constraining. Even if these
are viewed as non-expressive purposes, because they are more
related to physical sensations than expressing ideas, the choice as to
how one dresses, and the choice not to dress at all, usually have an
expressive component. Many types of clothing protect against the
elements. The particular clothing one chooses to wear, then, has little
to do with protection and everything to do with the image one
wishes to express, either because that image helps one feel good
about oneself, or because it conveys some message to others, or most
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991).
'0 Id. at 2462.
'4

51 Id.
52 Id. at 2463.

s' See id. at 2463-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 2463.
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likely both. This is especially true of the choice to go nude in public
in a society where being clothed is as dominant an ethic as here. The
moral objection to nudity as such arises precisely because it
represents such a challenge to society's prevailing ethic.
The obligation to tolerate challenging ideas is central to the
rationale for constitutionalizing free expression.'
It is just such
ideas which are most likely to be suppressed and therefore most
need protection against majority tyranny. Nor is it adequate, once
the commitment to protect expression has been made, to confine that
protection to verbal and written expression and to deny it to
expressive conduct. There must be some latitude not only to
verbalize one's ideas but also to practice them, so as to be able to test
them out and demonstrate their viability to others. To allow some
to practice what they preach and others not is to privilege the ideas
of the former over the latter and to bias the debate over competing
ideas in favor of those allowed to be practiced. A rationale such as
this would seem to underlie the constitutional protection expressly
accorded the free exercise of religion, as well as the general
protection for free association which has been found implicit in the
First Amendment.'
On the other hand, since all conduct is in some way
expressive, some line must be drawn between protected and
unprotected expressive conduct lest society be forced to tolerate in
the name of free expression the most reprehensible of conduct. Few
would justify protecting child abuse as the free exercise of religion
or assassination as free expression. The problem with the Supreme
Court's suppressive/non-suppressive governmental purpose test, as
a means of distinguishing between protected and unprotected
expressive conduct, is that it will (almost if not) always be possible
to advance some non-suppressive justification. 7 This is particularly
' See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 909 (1972); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See also supra notes 12, 14, 26.
m See TRIBE, supra note 45, at 1110-22, 1154-1204.
57 Indeed, in light of Barnes' acceptance of "societal order and morality," Barnes,
111 S.Ct. at 2461, as a sufficient non-suppressive justification for regulating public
nudity, it is difficult to comprehend why the moralistic rationale the state advanced
in the flag desecration cases, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) and United
States v. Eichman, 110 S.Ct. 2404 (1990), such as the public interest in preserving
the flag as "a symbol of nationhood and national unity," Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410,
did not pass muster. One possible explanation is, perhaps, that more of the Justices
are offended by nude dancing than by flag burning. The majority balked at the flag
desecration statutes on the ground that the government's purpose was a
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so when, as in Barnes, the protection of societal morality is declared
a non-suppressive purpose, since virtually every government
regulation can somehow be related to societal morality. Thus Barnes,
and other Supreme Court decisions premised on societal morality,
raise the specter of government-imposed morality with respect to
every aspect of social life, even the most personal.' 'There is a
totalitarian tinge to Barnes which is simply antithetical to a polity
committed to democratic pluralism.
It would be more consistent with democratic pluralism to
base the line between protected and unprotected expressive conduct
on whether the government's purpose is to protect others against
oppression or promote democratic pluralism, or whether the
objection to expressive conduct is merely that it offends sensibilities
or might stimulate unwanted social change. Under this approach, far
more deference would be accorded governmental regulation of
expressive conduct in the former instance than in the latter.
Regulation premised on offense to sensibilities would be upheld only
when everyone's sensibilities are taken into account and accorded
equal respect and protection.5 9 Regulation premised on the
prevention of unwanted social change would be upheld only when
that change would be oppressive or would undercut democratic
pluralism.
While like all distinctions the foregoing can be
manipulated, I would defend them on the ground that the promotion
and preservation of a non-oppressive democratic pluralism is the one
fundamental value which justifies limitations on free expression, that
tolerating offenses to sensibility and unwanted social change are
implicit in a commitment to democratic pluralism and free
expression, and that debating proposed restraints on expression in
these terms would be preferable to hiding behind assertedly
non-suppressive purposes and would strengthen the commitment to
democratic pluralism by focusing more attention on it as a
fundamental social value.
To the extent that the objection to public nudity per se on
moral grounds is based on an offense to sensibilities, as the Barnes
suppressive concern with the "communicative impact" of flag desecration. Eichman,
110 S. Ct. at 2409. But so, as the textual discussion establishes, does the objection
to public nudity derive from a concern with its communicative impact.
' See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding anti-sodomy statute,
as applied to consenting adult males in the privacy of their bedroom, justified by
majority sentiments about the immorality of homosexuality).
"' See generally MILL, supra note 17.
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plurality's silence on just what it is about nudity that Indiana could
justifiably find morally offensive would suggest, this approach would
disallow a total ban on public nudity. Indeed, since seeing others
clothed might be as offensive to those preferring nudity, the
egalitarian solution would seem to be that everyone has the right to
dress or undress as they see fit and that others who are offended
thereby must tolerate the situation as required by an egalitarian
democratic order. As far-fetched as that might seem given this
society's prevailing mores, I am quite serious in insisting that this
solution follows from a genuine commitment to democratic pluralism
and free expression. To show why, consider the now fanciful
example of a community in which a majority of the citizens favor
nudity and vote to ban the wearing of clothes as morally offensive.
If, like obscenity, "community standards"' are to govern sexual
mores generally, and it would seem hard to distinguish the two, then
the clothing ban should be upheld on the same ground that the
Barnes Court upheld the ban on nude dancing. But if the nudists
should have to live with the offense to their moral sensibilities of
seeing people clothed, and my sense is that believers in democratic
pluralism and free expression would not hesitate to say so, then the
same tolerance should be accorded the minority who prefer nudity
in our clothing-oriented society. At a minimum, if some concession
must be made to the prevailing morality as to this highly sensitive
matter, public nudity must be allowed in areas such as nudist clubs
closed off from the general public and in designated portions of
generally accessible areas such as public beaches and parks.61
o See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15

(1973).
'" There

are isolated public beaches, such as Black's Beach in San Diego, where

public nudity is tolerated. See Eric Bailey, Will Clothed Minds Prevail?, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1988, at 1 (Despite a 1977 law outlawing nude sunbathing, the beach
remains a major haven for nude sunbathers. Part of the reason the beach has been
free of massive public outrage is that it is not readily accessible. Due to
increasingly more crowded San Diego beaches, however, attention is being focused
on ensuring the beach's accessibility for the general public's use - not for nude
sunbathing.). In Munich, Germany's Englische Garten, the equivalent of New
York's Central Park, nudity is commonplace among the park's visitors. While
public nudity is illegal, the police do nothing to stop it. Germany is Taking Off Its
Clothes, UPI, July 12, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. See also Haig
Simonian, Nudists Take Figleaf Out of Germany's History Book, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1987, § 1, at 2. But to present the hardest case, suppose people assert the right to
engage in public sex. Absent sexist overtones, I see no logical or principled
distinction between public nudity and public sex, the objections to the latter of
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The moral objection to public nudity, however, if that indeed
is the policy underlying the Indiana statute, runs far deeper than a
mere offense to sensibilities. Certainly the objection is not an
aesthetic one, since most find the naked body quite pleasing. The
objection could be to the sexual overtones of the naked body, as
against the moral (largely religious) ethic that sex is an inherently
private matter. That raises the question of why that ethic arose. One
reason might be the protection of the family, which public nudity
might be thought to undercut by fostering sex outside of marriage.
Personally, I think the objection runs even deeper than that and is
related to promoting the work ethic which underlies modem
industrial society and to the attendant need to suppress sexuality as
potentially undermining that ethic, except for sex within the family
which has historically complemented industrialization and except to
the extent that sexuality can itself be (as it has increasingly become)
commodified and thereby incorporated within industrial society. In
any event, I would contend again that these are insufficient grounds
to justify banning public nudity because a commitment to free
expression and democratic pluralism demands toleration of divergent
life-styles as a way of people's expressing themselves and their views
about society.
Another disquieting aspect of Barnes is that the
suppressive/non-suppressive purpose test allows the government to
hide its suppressive purpose: first by regulating conduct more
broadly than it otherwise would so as to more easily advance a
non-suppressive purpose, and then by selectively enforcing the
regulation only or primarily against expressive conduct it wishes to
suppress. In O'Brien, for example, which upheld O'Brien's conviction
for knowingly destroying his draft card in the name of the efficient
administration of the draft, there is little doubt that the government
chose to prosecute because O'Brien publicly burned his draft card in
which will be similar to the former, only more pronounced. From an egalitarian
perspective, since the objection to public sex will boil down to an offense to moral
sensibilities or the attempt to prevent unwanted social change, and since those
desiring to engage in public sex may have to endure all kinds of expressive
activities which offend their moral sensibilities and promote the existing state of

affairs, then equal respect should dictate that others must tolerate the expressive
activity of public sex. Obviously this way of thinking is not about to gain
acceptance in this society at the present time. My only response is that hard cases
make bad law and that sometimes small steps must be taken before large ones.
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protest against the United States involvement in the Vietnam War. 62
Likewise in Barnes there are indications that Indiana was selectively
enforcing the ban on public-nudity, choosing not to enforce it for
example against nudity in various theatrical productions.'
This
suggests that the state's concern was not an objection to public
nudity per se and that its choice to enforce the ban in that case may
have been a content-based objection against nude dancing. If so, it
would be better to encourage the government to be up front about
its content-based objections to expression, to reexamine the bias
against content-based suppression in all but a few select contexts
(such as obscenity and libel), and to confront the objections on the
merits. This should produce a more clear cut and forthright
articulation of the objections to free expression, enabling society to
evaluate them more fully and signaling more clearly society's concern
in those instances when the objections win out. Bringing the debate
into the open should also produce a more thorough consideration of
the value of free expression and might thereby strengthen society's
commitment to it.
In his concurring opinion in Barnes, Justice Souter addressed
nude dancing directly, although not from a content-based
perspective." His argument was that the ban on nude dancing was
justified on account of the "pernicious secondary effects" associated
with the activity, such as prostitution, sexual assault and other
criminal activity.'
"Because the State's interest in banning nude
dancing results from a simple correlation of such dancing with other
evils, rather than from a relationship between the other evils and the
expressive component of the dancing, the interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression."' This attempt to avoid addressing
the expressive aspect of nude dancing, so as to bring it under the
non-suppressive side of the suppressive/non-suppressive purpose
test, is illusory and risks undermining free expression. Suppose
there were a correlation between religious worship and the
anti-social activities allegedly associated with nude dancing. It is
inconceivable that any court would uphold a ban on religious
62 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (upholding, on grounds of
administrative convenience, prosecution for failure to register for the draft of only
those who publicly announced their failure to register).
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456,2473 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).

Id. at 2468-70 (Souter, J., concurring).
6'Id. at 2469-70.

"Id. at 2471.
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worship on that account. Rather it would insist that the government
attack those activities directly so as to preserve the free exercise of
religion. If nude dancing is different, and if it is permissible to ban
nude dancing but not religious worship because of correlative
secondary effects, it must be that nude dancing is a less worthy
mode of expression than religious worship. Perhaps it is, but if so,
that issue should be confronted on the merits and not hidden behind
an assertedly non-suppressive smoke screen.
A content-based argument against nude dancing might be
that sexual crimes are not merely correlated with but are caused by
nude dancing's erotic message. This also, however, sweeps too
broadly as a justification for banning nude dancing. As Justice
White's dissent in Barnes points out: "[Glenerating thoughts, ideas
and emotions is the essence of communication. "67 If the anti-social
actions resulting from the emotions generated by otherwise protected.
expression were sufficient grounds for banning expression, then
virtually all expression could be banned. It is hard to think of any
expression of ideas that is controversial or of public moment and
does not stimulate some anti-social behavior. If something is to be
banned, a commitment to free expression ordinarily demands that it
be the perpetrator of the anti-social behavior and not the
communicator of the idea.' As the Barnes dissent argued: "If the
State is genuinely concerned with prostitution and associated evils
* * * it can adopt restrictions that do not interfere with the
69
expressiveness of nonobscene nude dancing performances.
Thus if expression is ever to be actionable in the face of a
commitment to free expression, it must be that the expression is in
and of itself harmful or causally associated with evils which cannot
otherwise be prevented. The free exercise of religion does not
protect the ritual sacrifice of children as a means of expressing one's
love of God because the state has a legitimate interest in preventing
at 2474 (White, J., dissenting).
See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (First Amendment protects

67 Id.

civil rights marchers from disorderly conduct prosecution despite hostile reactions

from onlookers); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (sustaining disorderly
conduct conviction on grounds that provocative speech constituted an incitement
to riot); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (mere fact that speech stirs public
to anger or creates a disturbance is insufficient to sustain conviction for disorderly
conduct).
6

Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2475 (White, J., dissenting).
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the child abuse which ritual sacrifice entails." Even pure speech
may at times be actionable, as when a parent continually berates a
child as inferior or stupid or when an employer sexually harasses
employees so as to create a hostile work environment.' In these
instances the speech itself causes harm which can only be avoided by
sanctioning the speech. The "fighting words" exception to free
speech is based in part on this rationale and in part on the likelihood
that such speech will provoke imminent violence which the speaker
must either intend or should realize will occur, but which cannot be
prevented because of the immediacy of the situation.7 And despite
the obligation, to which a commitment to free expression should
ordinarily give rise, to protect a speaker from an unruly crowd, it
may at times be impossible to prevent a riot without silencing the
speaker at least temporarily.'m But if free expression is to be a
preferred value, then "wherever 'more speech' would eliminate a
feared injury,
more speech is the constitutionally mandated
74
remedy.

If the only objection to nude dancing were the anti-social
behavior it unwittingly attracts due to its erotic message, then the
Barnes dissent is correct and those evils should be attacked directly
rather than by infringing free expression. A stronger objection,
though, might be that, much like sexual harassment in the work
place, nude dancing and other sexual expression so objectify women
as to directly degrade them and create a hostile social atmosphere in
" See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) (denying First

Amendment protection to a parent charged with involuntary manslaughter and

felony child endangerment for treatment of fatal illness with prayer rather than
medical care).
7'

See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (hostile

environment sexual harassment in the workplace is actionable under Title VII).
7' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
See infra text
accompanying notes 93-94, for further discussion of Chaplinsky.
73Where a riot occurs or is imminent, however, not because the speaker
intended to incite it, but due to hostile reaction to otherwise protected speech, the
most the government should be able to do if it cannot quell the riot is to stop the
speaker until it is able to do so, and not to punish the speaker. To punish the
speaker would allow the intolerant listeners to nullify the First Amendment. See
Justice Black's opinion in Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 113 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring), arguing that the way to deal with confrontational situations is through
time, place, and manner restrictions which would presumably keep opposing

groups apart. Id. at 113-26.
74TRIBE,

supra note 45, at 834.
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which more speech is not the solution both because the expression
directly damages women and because the social atmosphere has
become so polluted as to obscure the damage and drown out
rectifying speech. In the interest of countering this imbalance and
promoting a less sexist society, some restrictions on sexually
degrading speech are warranted.
However, despite the
reprehensibleness of sexist speech, it would be undesirable to
attempt to eliminate all such speech from the social fabric. Due to
a history of male dominance, Western culture is so replete with sexist
speech that to eliminate it all would require abolishing so much of
the culture that there would be little left to build on. Unfortunately,
many of this culture's greatest contributors were blind to the sexist
aspects of their thinking.'m If the culture is to thrive, it must build
on the positive aspects while rejecting the negative; yet though
rejected the negative will still remain a part of the culture's history,
if only as a reminder of past mistakes.
A content-based judgment must therefore be made as to
which sexist expression to restrict as a signal of society's disapproval.
Here several caveats are in order. First, whatever the restrictions,
much sexist expression will remain and much of it will be very
subtle and for this reason perhaps even more pernicious than the
blatant variety. Consequently, there will be a continuing need for
rectifying speech in order to raise people's consciousness of the
pervasiveness of sexist thinking and to advance a non-sexist social
order. Second, whether any given expression is in fact sexist, and if
so whether on balance it should be restricted, will often be highly
debatable. The greatest works of art are often ambiguous and open
to a variety of interpretations. What to one observer is a leering
condonation of sexism may to another be a satirical condemnation.
Even acknowledged sexist expression may be useful in the struggle
against sexism as a consciousness raising illustration. Consequently,
there must be ample prior debate of the merits of restricting
expression as overly sexist, both legislatively as to a given type of
"This is even true, alas, of thinkers as great as Aristotle: "[T]he male is by
nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled;
this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind."

THE COMPLETE WORKS OF

ARISTOTLE 1990 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984), and Nietzsche: "[A] man who has
depth of spirit... can only think of woman as Orientalsdo: he must conceive of
her as a possession, as confinable property, as a being predestined for service and
accomplishing her mission therein .... " NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL s.238
(Helen Zimmem trans., 1989).
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sexist expression and judicially as to whether a general restriction
sweeps too broadly and whether a particular expression is
sufficiently blatant to justify restricting it.
Third, care must be taken, while regulating overly sexist
expression, not to return to the puritanical paternalism which has
characterized much of this society's history and which has also
subjugated women in the guise of protecting them. 76 Again, the
need for debate. The problem is that currently women are not, and
in the short run will not likely be, adequately included in the debate
because society's law-making institutions (both legislatures and
judiciary) are dominated by men. This is not an argument against
restricting sexist expression, but for pointedly involving women in
the decision-making process. Legislatures must affirmatively seek
out and heed women's voices; juries which fairly represent the
community must play a leading role in evaluating allegedly sexist
expression. These steps should at least partially redress the
imbalance in the decision-making process, helping to identify overly
egregious sexist expression and to protect against overly paternalistic
regulation, as society struggles with its sexist heritage.
As for nude dancing, I must therefore conclude that the
process in Barnes was insufficient. The Court should have
overthrown the Indiana public indecency law as applied to nude
dancing, but should have left open the possibility for a permissible
restriction, if properly considered and applied. To pass muster, the
restriction should specifically address nude dancing in a sexist
context, should articulate why such nude dancing warrants
restriction, and should provide a record of supportive evidence and
legislative history demonstrating that a spectrum of views, especially
those of women, have been fully and fairly considered. In light of
the importance of free expression, a reviewing court should
scrutinize closely the process to ensure that the legislative body has
carefully considered the matter, that the supportive evidence is
substantial, and that women have been actively involved. Under
76 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding requirement that
only men register for the draft); Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape law applicable only to women under
eighteen); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding prohibition of female
bartender except for wife or daughter of male owner); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908) (upholding prohibition on employing women in factories more than ten
hours per day); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding exclusion of

women from practice of law).
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these conditions a restriction on nude dancing should survive facial
challenge. As applied to any particular expressive activity, those
charged with a violation must have the opportunity for a trial by
jury. The jury pool must fairly reflect a cross-section of the
community, and should be charged that for there to be a violation
the jury must find that the expression is patently offensive to
women, so degrades women as to be without redeeming social value,
and is not an integral part of a work of significant social value. The
jury's findings should be subject to judicial supervision in the form
of a motion for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and on appeal.'
These recommended standards and procedures are derived
from those which are or have been used in obscenity cases.' Their
purpose is to ensure that restrictions on expression are confined to
oppressive situations and do not infringe on socially valuable
expression. The purpose of the offensiveness standard is also to put
A similar approach should be used for judging racist and other hate speech,
with offensiveness to and degradation of the targeted group as the applicable
standard. See infra text accompanying notes 83-110.
The current test for obscenity, as set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) is:
(a) whether the 'average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to a prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by-the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24. This test replaced that enunciated in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957), the initial obscenity case, whose test was essentially the same as '(a)' above
and which also referred to obscenity as "utterly without redeeming social value."
Roth,,354 U.S. at 484. Despite my appropriation of the obscenity standard herein,
I actually have doubts about the legitimacy of banning obscenity absent some
connection to sexism or other oppressive practices. Sexist and other oppressionrelated expression lack social value precisely because of their oppressiveness. But
the Court has left obscenity unprotected largely by fiat and on the ground that the
framers of the First Amendment intended it so. Beneath the surface here, I suspect,
is a moral objection to obscenity similar to the Barnes Court's rationale for
upholding a ban on nudity, which I believe is overbroad and inegalitarian in that
it attempts to impose on all citizens the lawmakers' or the majority's views of the
good life. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991). It would be
better, it seems to me, to debate obscenity (and pornography) in terms of its
oppressiveness and to allow it to be regulated only when such effect can be
established.
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people on notice of those expressions likely to be deemed
objectionable, so as not to chill protected expression and to be fair to
the offending party. That the test is offensiveness to women (or
other targeted group) rather than to the average person somewhat
undercuts this purpose, since men may not be fully aware of what
women find offensive.
This fact merely demonstrates how
deep-seated sexist thinking is in this society and why some
restrictions on sexist speech are needed. But since males and male
ways of thinking have historically been, and remain, predominant (a
point also applicable to whites and others who use offensive
expression to foster oppression), an average person standard of
offensiveness would in practice likely become the standard of the
dominant group. 9 Thus the need for a standard of offensiveness
which will not simply perpetuate sexist (and racist, etc.) ways of
thinking, expression and acting, but will instead heighten sensitivity
to these evils.' Moreover, the fairness and chilling-effect concerns
are still addressed in that sanctioned expression must be "patently"
offensive and that men are included in the decision-making process
every step of the way. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these
standards and procedures are designed not only to protect against
overly intrusive regulation, but also to contribute to society's ongoing
and sorely needed dialogue regarding the value of free expression
and the harm of sexist expression.8' By so stimulating dialogue,
limited restrictions on sexist expression might actually hasten the day
79 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.

REV. 317 (1987); Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State:
Toward FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS 635 (1983); Matsuda, Looking, supra note 36;
Minow, supra note 36; Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An
Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
o Analogously, some courts have begun, for similar reasons, to depart from an
average person standard and to adopt a reasonable woman standard in sex
discrimination cases. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d

Cir. 1990).
"1See Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution:The
Anti-PornographyMovement in Minneapolis,39 STAN. L. REV. 607, 653 (1987), for an
account of the extended dialogue preceding the enactment of an anti-pornography
ordinance, subsequently vetoed by the mayor. The ordinance was modeled after

the Indianapolis ordinance discussed infra note 82.
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when regulation is no longer needed.'

82

The Indianapolis "anti-pornography" ordinance, struck down in American
Booksellers Assoc., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986), was an attempt at such a limited restriction and merits mention here. The
ordinance regulated trafficking in pornography, coercing others to perform in
pornographic works, forcing pornography on anyone, and assaults directly caused
by specific pornography. It defined pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit
subordination of women" in pictures or words, specifically including the
presentation of women as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation, who
experience pleasure being raped, who are tied up or physically hurt or penetrated
by objects or animals, who are presented in scenarios of degradation, or who are
presented as objects of domination. American Booksellers, 771 F.2d at 324. The
ordinance provided for administrative enforcement by the city's equal opportunity
advisory board pursuant to a process including a conciliation conference, a hearing
leading to a possible cease and desist order or award of compensatory damages,
and de novo judicial review. Id. at 326. In addition, anyone injured by someone
having seen or read pornography had a right of action against the maker or seller.
Id. at 325. While accepting the city council's findings that pornography harms
women in that "[d]epictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination," id.
at 329, the court nevertheless invalidated the ordinance on the ground that its
definition of pornography was unconstitutionally overbroad and entailed contentbased restriction of protected expression "no matter how great the literary or
political value of the work taken as a whole." Id. at 328.
It is not possible to do justice in a footnote to an ordinance as involved as
Indianapolis'. In terms of the approach advocated here, it did address directly its
content-based objections to pornography, was supported by empirical data, and
was adopted after extensive hearings, all of which advanced the public debate over
the merits and demerits of pornography. On the other hand, by its terms the
ordinance could be construed to reach much of what has heretofore been regarded
as great literature or at least as significant works of art, albeit perhaps sexist by
today's emerging standards. See id. at 327. As with obscenity, though, it would
seem difficult to come up with a narrower definition of pornography that would
avoid this problem. Therefore, given the adequacy of the legislative process in
debating and identifying the harm of pornography, I would uphold the definitional
aspect of the ordinance but insist on protections against overbreadth in the
application process. Here, my recommendation (as to which the ordinance falls
short) is that a jury trial be included in the process at some point, with the jury to
be charged not only as to the definition of pornography, but also as to the patentlyoffensive/degradation/significant-social-value standard - so as to provide for a
public airing and the bringing to bear of public sentiments each time the ordinance
is applied. With that added, and with the already built-in safeguard of de novo
judicial review, I would uphold the ordinance. To fully evaluate such an ordinance
both the public and the judiciary need the opportunity to see it in practice.
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C. In the Matter of the Welfare of R.A.V.
In contrast with Indiana's public indecency statute, the St.
Paul "hate speech" ordinance, upheld against a facial overbreadth
challenge in The Matter of the Welfare of R.A.'V. and currently on
appeal to the Supreme Court, stands in my view on much stronger
ground. The ordinance criminalizes placing "on public 'or private
property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti,
including but not limited to a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm,
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender."" The defendant was charged under the ordinance for
burning a cross inside the fenced yard of an African-American
family's home between 1:00a'm. and 3:00a.m. The trial court
dismissed on the ground that the ordinance violates the First
Amendment. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that "although the St. Paul ordinance should have been more
carefully drafted, it can be interpreted so as to reach only those
expressions of hatred and resorts to bias-motivated personal abuse
that the first amendment does not protect. !'" The court then limited
the ordinance to "expressive conduct that amounts to 'fighting
words"'" pursuant to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,87 and to
"conduct that is 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action"'" pursuant to
Brandenburg v. Ohio. 9 The case was then remanded for a trial on
the merits.
If, as interpreted, the St. Paul "hate speech" ordinance were
held applicable to the expressive conduct in question, this would
amount to a significant liberalization of the principles established in
Chaplinsky and Brandenburg. Brandenburgwas among a line of cases
designed to limit the government's ability to restrict speech. The
8 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
8 Id. at 508. The St. Paul ordinance is similar to one struck down in Skokie,

Illinois. See infra note 110. For pro and con opinions regarding such regulations, see,
respectively, Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First
Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 629 (1985) and NEIER, supra note 26.
R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 511.
8 Id. at 510.
87 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
88 R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510.
89395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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defendant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, had been convicted under Ohio's
Criminal Syndicalism statute which prohibited advocating and
assembling to advocate "the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime,
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform... ."90 The defendant
had attended and spoken at a KKK rally at a privately owned farm;
at the rally hooded figures carrying firearms gathered around and
burned a large wooden cross; much highly inflammatory and racist
language was used. The defendant spoke of the possible necessity
of "revengeance" if the government continued to suppress the white
race. Media representatives invited by the defendant filmed the
event, and the film was shown on local and national television. If
anything, the statute in Brandenburgwas even more narrowly drawn
than St. Paul's "hate speech" ordinance and the defendant's
expression there was even more egregious than in R.A.V.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court overturned the defendant's
conviction on the ground that "mere advocacy" of criminality is
insufficient to justify restricting speech and that "incitement to
imminent lawless action" is required. 1 If Brandenburg's expressions
did not amount to such, then neither surely did R.A.V.'s however
reprehensible and disturbing they obviously were.
R.A.V. is distinguishable from Brandenburgin that in the latter
the challenged expression was generalized, whereas in R.A.V. it was
directed against a particular family and could thus be seen as a
verbal assault.' History certainly tells us that a black family who
has a cross burned on its lawn has good reason to fear violence.
Such considerations underlie Chaplinsky's "fighting words" exception
Fighting words are "those which by their very
to free speech.'
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. " The reason fighting words tend to create a breach of the
peace is in part because they are insulting and thereby arouse the
target's emotions, but also because of the threatened violence which
is implicit in fighting words and thereby induces violence by the
90Id. at 444-45.
9'

Id. at 448-49.

' For arguments on restraints on verbal assault, see Delgado, Words, supra note
16; Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L.
REV. 287 (1991) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Insults]; Dean M. Richardson, Racism: A
Tort of Outrage, 61 OR. L. REv. 267 (1982).
' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
9 Id. at 572.
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target in preemptive self-defense. However, Chaplinsky's Supreme
Court progeny, none of which have upheld a fighting words
conviction, made it clear that as of now the exception is a narrow one
and that in the name of free speech people must learn to live with
much provocative, insulting, and even fearsome expression. To fall
within the exception, expression must be inherently inflammatory,"
be directed at a particular party,9 and tend to cause an immediate
breach of the peace rather than at some future time.' While the
cross burning in R.A.V. could meet the first two requisites, it would
be harder to show an immediate threat of violence.
Alternatively, one might seek support for the St. Paul "hate
speech" ordinance in Beauharnaisv. Illinois,' which affirmed against
a First Amendment challenge Chicago's "group libel" ordinance
criminalizing publications "portray[ing] depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion ...[or] expos[ing] the citizens of any race, color,

creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy."''
The
defendant had distributed a leaflet characterizing blacks as a group
as criminal and immoral. In light of Illinois' history of racial and
religious strife, the Court found the ordinance justified by the
government's interest in deterring violence and promoting order and
morality."° The St. Paul ordinance could easily be analogized to
Chicago's and justified on similar grounds, and in context the
burning of the cross could be seen as implying by conduct slights
similar to those directly expressed in Beauharnais. °
In light of subsequent legal developments, however, there is
reason to think either that Beauharnaisis no longer good law or that
it would now be interpreted quite narrowly. First, there is the
emphasis in Brandenburgand the post Chaplinsky cases of the threat
of imminent violence as necessary in order to justify restrictions on
's

Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
Id. at 277 n.1 (Reed, J., dissenting).
10' Id. at 258-59.
101For arguments in favor of regulating group defamation, see Kenneth Lasson,
Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the FirstAmendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 11 (1985); Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 16, at 2365-67; and Note, A
Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV.L. REv. 682 (1988). For an
argument against, see Greenawalt, Insults, supra note 92, at 302-07.
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inciteful expression. Second, the law of individual libel, to which the
BeauharnaisCourt analogized Chicago's group libel prohibition, has
been narrowed considerably since that time. To be libelous today an
expression must be false;" °u whereas, while the Beauharnais Court
repeatedly inferred that the racial slights there were false,"° it also
indicated that truth need not be a defense where defamatory
expression is in bad faith and presents the social harms there
found."°
Moreover, current doctrine distinguishes between
statements of fact whose truth or falsity can be established, and ideas
or opinions which are not susceptible to such analysis and therefore
cannot be libelous."°5 Much racist (and sexist) expression, probably
including the cross burning in R.A.V. and even the statements in
Beauharnais,would fall into the non-actionable category. Finally, it
is questionable whether the Court would now be willing to accept
sanctions against group libel at all, given its general ambivalence
toward group rights and interests."
If strictly limited, therefore, to situations which satisfy the
Brandenburgand Chaplinsky tests and the, at best, narrow reading of
Beauharnais,the reach of St. Paul's "hate speech" ordinance would be
quite narrow. For example, black families seeking to move into
white neighborhoods would have to endure organized efforts to
drive them out or scare them off through the use of derogatory
language, for example a sign containing a blatant racial insult on
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 755 (1985); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,341 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,28310

84(1964).
" Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 257-59, 261.
104Id. at 265-67.
0 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
"0While the Court does recognize group rights under the First Amendment's
rights of association and free exercise of religion, see TRIBE, supra note 45, its
ambivalence towards group rights is evident in its emphasis in voting rights cases
on the right to vote as an individual right and not according political groups an
independent constitutional claim to representation, see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and in the efforts of the

Court's growing conservative majority to limit race discrimination remedies to the
actual victims of discrimination rather than members of the victims' class, see
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), and to disallow
affirmative action measures designed to rectify generalized societal discrimination
against a class as a whole, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989), and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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many of their white neighbors' front lawns, so long as in context
there is no threat of imminent lawless action or an immediate breach
of the peace, and so long as the derogatory remarks are not provably
false or fall into the opinion category. Few black families could
withstand such an assault. Not only does violence frequently
accompany such insults, but even in the absence of violence few of
us are strong enough to endure repeated expressions that we are
deemed inferior and are disliked and unwanted. Such expressions
help perpetuate the racial polarization and de facto segregation
which persist in this country."° To so allow bigoted whites to
promote white supremacy not only as an idea but in practice is to
privilege their interests in the name of free expression over the
interest of minorities in a more egalitarian society. The suggestion
here, therefore, is that in such contexts the pursuit of democratic
pluralism justifies limited restrictions on expression, while
recognizing that much subtle racist expression must still be
allowed."°
In terms of the approach advanced here for evaluating such
restrictions, St. Paul's ordinance stands on quite solid ground. Its
purpose is to attack oppression and promote pluralism. It directly
addresses and is up front about its content-based objection to hate
speech, thereby advancing public debate. There is much evidence of
the historical relationship between hate speech and oppression, of the
damage hate speech causes, and of the difficulty society has had in
combatting the harms associated with hate speech."° Although the

'"

See Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 16, at 2358, describing racist speech

as being "particularly harmful because it is a mechanism of subordination,
reinforcing a historical vertical relationship." Id. at 2358.
o See id. at 2356-74, arguing for the recognition of a racist speech exception to
the First Amendment to be applied to the "worst forms" of racist speech, that is,
those whose message is racial inferiority, is directed against an historically
oppressed group, and is persecutorial, hateful and degrading. But what about
racist expression directed against whites, or sexist expression directed against men?
While there are situations in which minorities and women dominate, for the most
part this is not true. When not, such expression is non-oppressive and 'would be
non-actionable under the approach advocated here. Nevertheless, this would lead
to an inegalitarian and therefore impermissible result, in that whites and men
would have to tolerate offensive expression comparable to that which minorities

and women would not.
"oSee Delgado, Words, supra note 16; Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 16,
at 2356-60, for discussions of race hate messages and, in contrast, of marxist speech,
McCarthyism, and South African ideology.
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Minnesota Supreme Court did not make as thorough an inquiry as
advocated here of the City Council's legislative process so as to
ensure due deliberation, hopefully the United States Supreme Court
will do so. The ordinance gives reasonable notice of the type of
expression covered. The explicit reference to the widely recognized
hate symbols of a burning cross and Nazi swastika suggests that
something similarly egregious would be required for conviction. The
reference to knowing arousal of anger, alarm or resentment confines
application to contexts which are confrontational or turbulent and in
which the perpetrator is or should be aware of the harmfulness of
the hateful expression. While a showing of intent to cause harm is
not explicitly required, it is apparent the ordinance is aimed at just
such expressions, thus leaving open ample opportunity to debate
heatedly issues of race, religion and gender.
As to .the particular charge of burning a cross in, an
African-American family's yard, since that is one of the situations
expressly alluded to in the statute and since it is obvious that such
expression is patently offensive to blacks and is obviously without
redeeming social value, there should be little difficulty sustaining a
conviction so long as the trial is fair and there is sufficient evidence
of intent to harm. A conviction will certainly not end racism in St.
Paul. But perhaps it will help create an atmosphere in which black
families can more easily move into white neighborhoods and in
which a community based on mutual tolerance and respect can
emerge and thrive."0
"' Two recent cases resembling R.A.V. bear mention. In Collin v. Smith, 578
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978), the court overthrew the denial
of a permit for a Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois, on the basis of an ordinance
providing for denial upon a finding that the assembly would incite violence,
hatred, abuse or hostility by reason of religious or ethnic affiliation. The march
was to involve thirty to fifty demonstrators wearing uniforms with swastikas and
carrying a party banner with a swastika and placards.with pro-white sentiments.
Collin is not as strong a case as R.A.V. The ordinance was hastily enacted in
response to the planned march. Since it entailed a prior restraint, there was no
opportunity to evaluate the marchers' actual expressive activities. The openness
and planned peacefulness of the march made it more easily avoidable and less
threatening than the secretive cross burning in R.A. V. And the decision to deny the
permit was made by an appointed official without public involvement, and could
be waived only with unanimous consent of Skokie's Board of Trustees. Nonetheless
Skokie was chosen for the march because of the many Jews (including several
thousand Holocaust survivors) living there, in context the swastika is as offensive
and degrading to Jews as the cross burning in R.A.V. to blacks, and the local
impact of the ban would leave open opportunities for Nazis to march in other less
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III. CONCLUSION
Limited regulation of racist and sexist expression may
contribute to attacking the evils of sexism and racism, but for the
most part the solution lies in active and on-going political struggle.
Sexist and racist expression must be countered with non-sexist and
non-racist expression. People must be educated and mobilized.
When pseudo-scientists make claims of racial inferiority and
biologically determined gender roles, their pseudo-science must be
sensitive contexts. So for me the case is close enough for the ordinance and denial
to stand had the decision-making process been more open, including public
hearings prior to enactment and a jury trial to contest the denial, so that the issue
could be given a thorough public airing.
In John Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
the court overthrew as overbroad on its face and as applied, and as void for
vagueness, a University regulation that punished in educational and academic
centers verbal or physical behavior which "stigmatizes or victimizes" an individual
based on race, sex, and other named statuses and which involves a threat to or has
the purpose or foreseeable effect of interfering with academic efforts or personal
safety. Racial and sexual harassment have increased on college campuses and were
found to have done so at Michigan. The University held public hearings before
adopting its regulation, and had an elaborate enforcement procedure including
informal counseling/mediation and formal hearings before a panel of four students
and a tenured faculty member. While without more the stigmatizing/victimizing
standard does seem rather vague, the University had issued an Interpretative Guide
containing specific examples of sanctionable behavior. Some of the examples
clearly seem patently offensive, degrading, and without redeeming social value; for
instance, a flyer containing racist threats distributed in a residence hall, or male
students leaving pornographic pictures and jokes on the desk of a female graduate
student. Others examples are more dubious, for instance, excluding someone from
a study group because that person is of a different race, sex or ethnic origin.
Moreover there were some questionable applications of the regulations. Although
found not guilty, a graduate student was formally charged with and tried for
harassment based on sexual orientation for stating in class and heatedly debating
his belief that homosexuality is a disease. Another student agreed after counseling
to write a letter of apology to a minority professor who filed a complaint when the
student stated in class that he heard minorities had a difficult time in the course
and were not treated fairly. Assuming the court accurately portrayed these
instances, the regulation's application does seem overbroad and chilling. However,
while open inquiry is central to and must be vigorously protected in the university
setting, a university is also a relatively closed environment where students cannot
easily tune out offensive speech, especially in classrooms and dormitories, and
where overly offensive speech can pollute the educational environment. Therefore,
in my view, a regulation more narrowly drawn, interpreted and applied, so as to
reach the most egregious and offensive of expressions, would pass muster under
the egalitarian approach advocated here.
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debunked. When students are intolerant of each other, then
tolerance must be taught. When 100 Nazis march, there must be
1,000 counter demonstrators. When racist and sexist imagery
pervades the media, the media and its sponsors must be boycotted.
Writers and artists must strive through their works, and all of us
who want to be part of the solution must strive in our daily lives, to
raise people's consciousness of the existence and persistence of these
evils.
More than that, though, the social conditions which produce
racist and sexist thinking and practice must be attacked. Racism and
sexism are dominative and exploitative. They create and are at the
same time an outgrowth of inequality. Despite all the egalitarian
rhetoric which pervades this society's political and moral ethic (such
as, all are created equal), in fact the United States remains highly and
increasingly inegalitarian. Moreover, other facets of the society's
ethic justify this inequality, as, for instance, the inevitable by-product
of the society's commitment to reward based on individual merit and
to competition as a means of advancing the general welfare.
Ultimately, therefore, the free speech issue is related to a broader
struggle over competing visions of the good life and the just society.
Those of us who believe the existing order is oppressive and who are
committed to a more egalitarian and pluralistic democracy must
support free expression as integral in principle to an egalitarian social
order and in practice to our efforts to effect change. Limited
restrictions on expression may contribute to that struggle, but should
be seen as interim measures necessitated by existing power
imbalances and to be dispensed with when a more egalitarian social
order is achieved.

